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Kids are getting lost in the
tobacco deal shuffle
l ;{ Thy did Big Tobacco agree to pay
Y V S368 billion O\'er 25 years to settle
state Medicaid suits? And why is it now
paying tens of millions to lobbyists to get
the pact through Congress? Maybe
because the industry feared the e,idence
that might be found in its own secret files.
This week, some of R.J. Rernolds'
documents came out, and they were
damning.
Despite RJR's public, sworn denials
to the contrarv, the maker of Camel,
\Vinston and Salem cigarettes directed
marketing efforts at adolescents.
"To ensure increased and longerterm grov.'th for Camel Filter, the brand
must increase its share penetration
among the 14-24 age group," v.Tote RJR
officialJ.W. Hind in 19i5.
"fa;dence is now a\'ailable to indicate that the 14- to 18-year-old group is
an increasing segment of the smoking
population. RJR-T (RJR Tobacco) must
soon establish a successful new brand in
this market if our position in the industry is to be maintained O\'er the long
term," said a 19i6 memo.
Subsequent memos through the
1980s revealed the company looked at
the influence of peer groups on "young
adult" choices in smoking, with one
chart identif)ing "younger adult" smokers including 12-year-olds.
The effort led to the comic character
Joe Camel, a bereted hipster who became
as recognizable to 5-year-olds as Bugs
Bunny and helped make Camel a topthree brand among the under-18 crowd.
Such duplicity raises serious doubts
about giving the industry immunity from
future lawsuits, as the deal proposes. But
that's just one reason this deal is starting
to look sour. Others arc equally damning:

It's a good deal for the industry.
Despite the whopping S368 billion payout to def:-av the cost to :'\1edicaid for
smoking-reiated illnesses and other
programs, L½e companies would scarcely
fed it on L½eir bortom lines.
A srudv tY the Federal Trade
Co:nnussio; fo~nd that after tax deductions and other oEsets, the total cost to
the indust.7 would be only about SlOO
billion. :\nd eYen that is illusorv.
Provisions granting the compani~s
exemptions from antitrust laws and limits on their liabiii~· would allow them to
increase profit m~gins by limiting price
competition and curring costs.
The dewr.akcrs arc losing sight of
the objective. Tnc bortom line for the
states, the Clinton administration,
health groups and Congress should be
public health. Yet eagerness to get hold
of the money for election-year spending
appears increasingly to be dri"ing the
process.
The Clinton administration, after
negotiating a ncariy 50/50 split of the
hoped-for proceeds v.;th the states,
plans to pay a third of a new S21 billion
child-care plan with money from the
deal. Bills in Congress would set aside
more to pay off cultural and sports
groups that lose tobacco's sponsorship
money under the pact. Other bills set
aside billions for tobacco farmers and for
health research.
The danger is clear: In their
eagerness to get their hands on the
money, they'll be more willing to settle
for a bad deal.
Tobacco has often outwitted its
foes. In the 1960s, Congress negotiated
an agreement ~ith tobacco companies
to put a warning on cigarette packs. The

companies then used that as a shield
against liability. The industry like,\ise
wheedled its way around TV advertising
bans by pa)ing actors to smoke and
adeptly placing their billboards in camera lines at sporting events.
This deal has a lulu of a loophole
on federal regulation of the addictive
nicotine content of cibarertcs. The Food
and Drug Administration would have to
prove the unpronblc - that a cutback
on nicotine in brands sold here wouldn't
create a black market for foreign cigarettes.
The president moved in the right
direction last fall by suggesting ways to
toughen the pact. Because e,idencc
shows people who don't smoke by 21
aren't likely to start, the key to making
the deal work is to stop teens from
smoking. So he proposes fining companies up to Sl.50 a pack if teen smoking
doesn't drop significantly.
But why gi\'c the industry immunity from lawsuits in order to do that?
Congress doesn't need tobacco's permission to hike tobacco taxes by S1 to S2 a
pack, enact extreme fines for any sales to
minors, or to regulate nicotine as an
addictive product. It needs only to give
up its own addiction to tobacco's big
political contributions.
Perhaps negotiators can still find
a way to toughen the proposed deal. But
in the meantime, the tobacco settlement
looks more like a bargain for the industry to keep making money - and government to spend it - than a health
program to get people, especially kids, to
stop smoking.

